



We live in an era of proliferating criminal offenses. Traditional
common law felonies could be counted on two hands. I The Kansas
criminal code now contains over nine hundred felonies. 2 The Kansas
Legislature no doubt will continue to add to this already long list. This is
understandable and often desirable. Our changing society is constantly
becoming more complex; existing offenses have gaps; and
democratically elected legislatures have strong incentives to address
popularly perceived threats.
One of the more important and vexing legal issues created by this
constant offense multiplication concerns their interrelationship.3 Maya
parent who batters a child be convicted of and punished for both
aggravated battery and child abuse?4 May a person who manufactures
methamphetamine be punished both for manufacturing and for
possessing necessary ingredients with an intent to manufacture?5 Maya
person who sells cocaine he knows to be talcum powder be convicted of
and punished both for theft by deception6 and for representing a
noncontrolled substance as a controlled substance?7 As a consequence of
• Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law. The author would like to thank
Melanie Wilson, Jelani Jefferson, and Ed Klumpp for their many helpful comments.
I. See 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 201-02
(London, MacMillan 1883) (listing common law felonies that existed according to Bracton).
2. KAN. SENTENCING COMM'N, KANSAS SENTENCING GUIDELINES: DESK REFERENCE
MANUAL app. E (2007), available at http://www.kansas.govlksc/2007desk.shtml. See generally
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics o/Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 512-19
(2001) (discussing the breadth of state and federal criminal codes).
3. See Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation 0/ American
Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 635 (2005) (a major problem with modem criminal codes
involves "the proliferation of numerous new offenses that duplicate, but may be inconsistent with,
prior existing offenses"); Stuntz, supra note 2, at 519 (as a result of offense proliferation,
"defendants who commit what is, in ordinary terminology, a single crime can be treated as though
they committed many different crimes-and that state of affairs is not the exception, but the rule").
4. See State v. Alderete, 172 P.3d 27 (Kan. 2007).
5. See State v. Schoonover, 133 P.3d 48 (Kan. 2006); see infra Parts II.C, 111.8.2.
6. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3701(a)(2) (2007).
7. § 65-4155 (2002).
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the burgeoning number of offenses, questions such as these pervade the
Kansas criminal code.
The answers to these questions have considerable practical and
intellectual significance. Allowing multiple convictions can add years to
criminal sentences because consecutive sentences are imposed or
because the elevated criminal history score lengthens the term of
imprisonment for subsequent offenses. Aside from obvious impacts on
offenders' loss of liberty and on public protection, this in turn affects
prosecutorial charging discretion, judicial sentencing discretion, plea
bargaining incentives, and stresses on prison capacity. Offense
interrelationships have intellectual significance beyond these practical
consequences because the coherence of the criminal code is at stake.
How is the relationship between offenses decided? The legislature
of course may specify the intended relationship, but it rarely does so. By
default, courts decide. The concepts of the "same" offense, multiplicity,
merger, lesser included versus greater offenses, and specific versus
general offenses come into play. Courts struggle to give these concepts
meaning with resort to generally worded statutes8 and a number of
competing legal tests. 9 Yet the guidance furnished by these statutes,
concepts, and tests is decidedly imperfect, particularly in the context of
an increasingly crowded and complex statutory terrain. The result is
confusion and inconsistency. 10
In light of the attendant difficulties, Kansas law not surprisingly has
experienced its share of confusion and controversy. The Kansas
Supreme Court of late has become extremely active in addressing the
interrelationship of drug offenses. II Its decision in State v. McAdam, 12
which had the effect of reducing the guideline sentences for
methamphetamine manufacture by roughly ten years, caused quite a stir
and prompted a swift legislative reaction. In another more recent drug
case, State v. Schoonover,13 the court candidly acknowledged uncertainty
8. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3107 (2007); MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07 (1962).
9. See Schoonover, 133 P.3d at 66-79; Michael H. Hoflheimer, The Rise and Fall 0/ Lesser
Included Offenses, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 351, 364-65 (2005) (discussing various approaches to defining
lesser included offenses).
10. Cf Bruce A. Antkowiak, Picking Up the Pieces o/the Gordian Knot: Towards a Sensible
Merger Methodology, 41 NEW ENG. L. REv. 259, 260 (2007) (describing the law on whether
mUltiple punishments may be imposed for separate offenses as "a mess").
11. State v. Cooper, 179 P.3d 439 (Kan. 2008); State v. Fisher, 154 P.3d 455 (Kan. 2007); State
v. Fanning, 135 P.3d 1067 (Kan. 2006); Schoonover, 133 P.3d at 48; State v. Patten, 122 P.3d 350
(Kan. 2005); State v. Campbell, 106 P.3d 1129 (Kan. 2005); State v. Stevens, 101 P.3d 1190 (Kan.
2004); State v. McAdam, 83 P.3d 161 (Kan. 2004).
12. 83 P.3d 161 (Kan. 2004).
13. 133 P.3d 48 (Kan. 2006).
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in its previous cases I4 and, to restore order, sketched out what is intended
to be a comprehensive approach.
This Article examines Kansas case law addressing the
interrelationship of drug offenses. The case law is marked not only by
uncertainty, but also by inconsistency.ls In fact, the only seeming
constant has been an approach of legal formalism l6 that often produces
results that make little sense as a matter of statutory interpretation or
policy. The Kansas Supreme Court's recent Schoonover decision tries to
systematize the formalism. Even if the systematization effort succeeds in
reducing uncertainty, it has produced and will continue to produce
seriously unsound results. This Article proposes an alternative. Its
approach is rooted in realism about the legislative process and sensitivity
to the overall aims of the criminal code. In its emphasis on careful
attention to context and legislative purpose, this approach bears
considerable affinity with the legal process school that grew out of
critiques of legal formalism. 17 The approach urged here, which is
14. [d. at 77 (noting "the doctrinal inconsistency and confusion that abounds in [Kansas]
multiplicity cases").
15. The decisions are so convoluted that the court itself has had difficulty keeping them
straight. In State v. Fanning, for instance, the court mischaracterized the holding of State v. Patten.
135 P.3d at 1071. Patten held that manufacturing methamphetamine is not multiplicitous with
possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture. 122 P.3d 350, 355-56. The court in
Fanning described Patten as holding that there was no multiplicity for convictions of attempted
manufacture (an offense of which the defendant in Patten was not convicted) and possession of drug
paraphernalia. 135 P.3d at 1071. Similarly, State v. Campbell withdrew an opinion the court had
issued in the case the preceding month. 106 P.3d 1129 (2005). There was no explanation for the
withdrawal. The earlier opinion had reached the opposite conclusion, affirming instead of reversing
the district court's sentence. State v. Campbell, 101 P.3d 1179 (Kan. 2004), withdrawn, 106 P.3d
1129 (Kan. 2005).
16. The formalist sees the law as a self-contained logical system such that
the major premises in our problem-solving scheme are no more (and no less) than the
rules of law; the processes consist exclusively of formal logic; and the correctness of our
results is to be verified by an 'internal' analysis, i.e., by asking whether the result coheres
with the truths offered by law.
ROBERT 1. HAYMAN, JR., NANCY LEVIT & RICHARD DELGADO, JURISPRUDENCE CLASSICAL AND
CONTEMPORARY: FROM NATURAL LAW TO POSTMODERNISM 157 (2d ed. 2002); see Justice Oliver
W. Holmes, Jr., Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., The Path of the Law, Address at the Dedication of
the New Hall of the Boston University School of Law (Jan. 8,1897), in 10 HARV. 1. REv. 457, 465
(1897) (describing formalism as the view that the law "can be worked out like mathematics from
some general axioms" such that an erroneous judicial decision is one in which the judges are not
"doing their sums right"). Formalism emphasizes rules and, in its most extreme form, denies that
judges have discretion in selecting or applying rules, which are instead seen as flowing mechanically
from text or precedent. Formalism deemphasizes and, in extreme versions, denies outright the role
of statutory or doctrinal purposes in rule selection and application. See generally Guido Calabresi,
Essay, Two Functions of Formalism, 67 U. CHI. 1. REv. 479 (2000); Thomas C. Grey, Modern
American Legal Thought, 106 YALE 1.J. 493, 495-96 (1996) (book review); Frederick Schauer,
Formalism, 97 YALE 1.J. 509 (1988).
17. The classic statement of legal process theory is found in HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT
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focused more on harm and culpability than on mechanical tests, promises
to improve the court's jurisprudence on the dimensions of both statutory
interpretation and criminal justice policy.
II. THE CURRENT FORMALISM
This Part discusses the main features of the Kansas Supreme Court's
decisions. The legislature quickly overturned the initial decisions,18
which favored the defense by dramatically reducing penalties for those
involved in making methamphetamine. Possibly in response, the court's
more recent decisions have tended to come out in favor of the
prosecution. The common thread has been reliance on a jurisprudential
approach fitting the description of legal formalism. For a formalist, the
law is an essentially self-contained logical system of rules and doctrines.
A judge's role is to reach correct results by a process of a priori
deduction from the meaning of legal rules, terms, and concepts. A
decision's practical consequences, statutory purposes, policy concerns,
the teachings of other disciplines, and social reality more generally are
dismissed as extraneous and irrelevant. 19 This Part's aim is to show that,
partly as a consequence of their formalist underpinnings, neither the
decisions favoring defendants nor those favoring the State reflect
legislative intent or sound policy.
A. Manufacture Versus Distribution: State v. McAdam
Kansas statutes and sentencing guidelines prescribe markedly
different punishments for manufacture and distribution of illegal drugs.
Manufacture is a drug severity level 1 felonlo for which the sentencing
guidelines mandate extremely severe punishment. According to the
guidelines, even a first-time offender is to receive a term of
imprisonment of over twelve years. 21 Distribution, by contrast, is
M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). Legal process theorists assign statutory
and doctrinal purpose a central role in legal interpretalion. They tend to see the judicial task as
advancing those purposes in case-specific contexts rather than as applying rules that correspond
imperfectly to the reasons giving rise to those rules. See Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia's
Democratic Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529, 539--40 (1997) (book review).
18. The legislature enacted section 65-4159a (Supp. 2007) in response to McAdam, and
amended section 65-4150(c) (Supp. 2007) in response to Campbell. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-41 59a,
-4 I 50(c) (Supp. 2007).
19. See supra note 16.
20. § 65-4 I59(b).
21. KAN. SENTENCING COMM'N, KANSAS SENTENCING GUIDELINES: DESK REFERENCE
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generally a drug severity level 3 felony.22 The sentencing guidelines put
a first-time offender into a "border box," with a presumptive
imprisonment of one year and three months.23 A recent study concluded
that the Kansas guideline sentences for manufacture are harsher24 and
those for distribution are generally more lenient25 than in other selected
guideline states.
In State v. McAdam, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the then
applicable definition of "manufacture" made it an offense identical to
"distribution.,,26 When two identical offenses exist, the court declared,
the less severe penalty controls.27 It accordingly held that those
convicted of manufacture could be sentenced only for the less severe
offense of distribution.
The court based its conclusion on an entirely formalistic comparison
of the offenses. It observed that the distribution offense prohibited
"compounding" as well as selling or dispensing a controlled substance.
Because the definition of manufacture also encompassed
"compounding," and the State had not adequately shown that
methamphetamine is made by means other than "compounding,"
manufacture constituted the same offense as distribution.28 The court did
not discuss legislative history or intent. It did not discuss the
consequences of its decision, which dramatically reduced the length of
the sentences available for making methamphetamine by more than ten
years. Nor did the court identify any policy goal served by its decision.
Instead, it relied entirely on the abstract definition of the offenses found
in the statutes' literal text. Consistent with the tenets of legal formalism,
the court evidently viewed its role as ensuring the logical coherence of
the law regardless of consequences or policy.
McAdam's result is at odds with both legislative intent and criminal
justice policy. It is understandable that "compounding" would be
MANUAL app. G, at 1 (2007), available at http://www.kansas.govlksc/2007desk/2007%20Drug%
20Grid.pdf.
22. §§ 65-4161(a), -4163(a). The severity level increases for those who committed the offense
within 1000 feet of a school, §§ 65-4161(d), -4163(b), or who distributed certain opiates or
stimulants and who have one or more prior convictions for such distribution, § 65-4161(bHc).
23. KAN. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 21.
24. DON STEMEN, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE KANSAS SENTENCING GUIDELINES: AN
EVALUATION OF PROPORTIONALITY OF SENTENCES 50--51 (2004), available at http://www.
accesskansas.orglksc/documentslProportionality%20Study.pdf.
25. ld. at 49. While Kansas guideline sentences for distribution of small amounts of drugs
"fall[] in the middle of presumptive sentences for the same offense in other states," sentences for
distribution of larger amounts are "lower than the presumptive sentences in most other states." ld.
26. 83 P.3d 161, 167--68 (Kan. 2004).
27. ld. at 168.
28. /d. at 166--67.
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included in the distribution offense. Kansas drug statutes are modeled on
the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, which establishes a framework
for civil regulation of pharmacies as well as creating criminal offenses?9
Pharmacies, of course, routinely compound pharmaceuticals. Further,
the Uniform Controlled Substances Act treats manufacture and
distribution of illicit drugs as part of a single crime.30 When the Kansas
Legislature created separate crimes for distribution and manufacture, the
term "compounding" was evidently carried over into the prolix
definitions of both distribution and manufacture. But the use of the term
"compounding" in the distribution offense had no effect on the
Legislature's intent or criminal justice practices. The Legislature's intent
to treat the making of methamphetamine as manufacture could not have
been clearer. 31 The harsh penalty for manufacture was primarily targeted
at precisely this conduct.32
As for policy, the principal problem with identical offenses is that
they give prosecutors unfettered charging discretion. But McAdam did
not mention this as a basis for its decision, much less provide any reason
to believe that prosecutors were arbitrarily charging the making of
methamphetamine as manufacture sometimes and as distribution other
times. As far as anyone was or is aware, prosecutors had understood and
followed the legislature's design and consistently charged the making of
methamphetamine as manufacture.
29. See State v. Luginbill, 574 P.2d 140, 143 (Kan. 1977) (noting that the "National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the Uniform Controlled Substances Act" in 1970
and that "[t)wo years later Kansas adopted" the Act). The 1994 version of the Uniform Controlled
Substances Act, which is the most recent, is available online at http://www.law.upenn.
edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ucsa94.htm. For examples of provisions outlining civil regulations of
pharmacies, see UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT §§ 302-06, 308, 602, 603, 605 (1994); see
also, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4102 (2002).
30. UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT § 401 (1994).
31. Section 65-7006(a) of the Kansas Statutes criminalizes the possession of listed ingredients
of methamphetamine with an intent to manufacture. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-7006(a) (Supp. 2007).
When McAdam was decided, section 65-7006(d) made the crime a drug severity level I felony. §
65-7006(d) (2002) (current version at § 65-7006(f) (Supp. 2007)). The legislature obviously wished
to punish the actual making of methamphetamine at least at this severity level rather than at drug
severity level 3, which is applicable to the distribution offense.
32. Kansas law enforcement agents, prosecutors, and defense attorneys report that drugs such
as LSD, heroin, cocaine, and ecstasy are rarely manufactured in Kansas and that virtually all
manufacturing convictions relate to methamphetamine. l1lustrative legal database searches confirm
this reality. A LEXIS search of "K.S.A. 65-4159 w/6 methamphetamine" yields over sixty cases,
most of which involved a defendant who was convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine or a
related offense. LEXIS searches of "K.S.A. 65-4159 w/IO cocaine" and "manufactur! w/IO
cocaine" yielded no cases in which a defendant had been convicted of manufacturing cocaine. The
same was true respecting heroin, LSD, and ecstasy. The legislature, which regularly hears testimony
from the Kansas Bureau of Investigation and prosecutors, is undoubtedly aware of the reality that the
manufacturing offense almost exclusively targets methamphetamine makers.
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McAdam thus responded to a problem that, in practical terms, did not
exist. The imprecise drafting of the manufacturing and distribution
offenses evidently had no effect whatever on charging or sentencing
practices. One can understand how this imprecision might confound a
legal formalist, who views the law as an abstract logical system and the
role of the judge as vindicating the law's formal coherence. For the
nonformalist, however, the Kansas Supreme Court's remedy is grossly
disproportional. Inconsequential legislative-drafting imprecision does
not justify the extremely consequential judicial moves of eliminating the
intended line between manufacture and distribution and reducing the
guideline sentence for making methamphetamine by more than ten years.
It was hardly a surprise that the legislature reacted by quickly
overturning McAdam. A few months after the Kansas Supreme Court
handed down McAdam, the legislature added section 65-4159a of the
Kansas Statutes, reasserting the line it thought it had already drawn
between distribution and manufacture.33
With some creativity, the Kansas Supreme Court could have fixed
the imprecision in a manner consistent with the legislature's intent and
without gratuitously reducing sentences. For instance, the court could
have interpreted the term "compounding" in harmony with its statutory
context. Thus, as used in the distribution offense, "compounding" would
take its meaning from the other forms of distribution mentioned in the
statute, which all involve the transfer of a drug from one person to
another. 34 The practice of cutting drugs with diluents, which is
commonly part of illicit drug sale, would thus constitute "compounding"
within the meaning of the distribution offense. The term
"compounding," as used in the manufacturing offense, likewise would
take its meaning from the other forms of manufacture mentioned therein.
All of these forms of manufacture involve bringing a drug into existence
rather than transferring the finished product to another person.35 It is
hardly unusual for the same term to have a different meaning in different
33. Section 65-4l59a provides that one who is convicted of manufacturing "is guilty of a drug
severity level I felony" and the "sentence shall not be reduced to violating [the distribution statutes]
because prior to this act, such statutes prohibited the identical conduct." § 65-4l59a (Supp. 2007).
This section may have only prospective effect. McAdam applies to convictions based on acts
occurring before the effective date of section 65-4l59a and requires that those convicted of
manufacturing be sentenced at drug severity level 3 rather than severity level I.
34. See § 65-4l61(a) ("[I]t shall be unlawful for any person to sell, offer for sale or have in
such person's possession with intent to sell, deliver or distribute; prescribe; administer; deliver;
distribute; or dispense ....").
35. See § 65-4IOI(n) (defining "manufacture" to include, inter alia, "production, preparation,
propagation").
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statutory contexts.36 The technique of interpreting one term in keeping
with other terms listed in the same provision underlies the familiar
maxim of statutory interpretation know as ejusdem generis. 37 In its
formalism, however, the McAdam court did not search for a solution in
harmony with the legislature's intent.
McAdam therefore represents legal formalism in its least defensible
form. It is law that is divorced from real world context, practical
consequences, and legitimate policy concerns. It uses an arid devotion to
literal text and abstract legal doctrine to frustrate both clear legislative
intent and criminal justice values. As is true of formalist results
generally, McAdam's holding cannot be defended on the ground that it
was compelled by legal text. Even indulging the assumption that the
term "compounding" has exactly the same meaning in the distribution
and manufacture offenses, McAdam requires the additional premise that
the punishment for identical offenses is controlled by the more lenient
penalty. This premise is a judicial confection: it nowhere appears in the
code, reflects no constitutional requirement, and, as Part III argues,38
should be rejected. As McAdam's aftermath illustrates, formalism can
create a relationship between the courts and the legislature that is
needlessly uncooperative, if not antagonistic.
B. Paraphernalia Versus Precursors: State v. Campbell
Separate provisions of the Kansas Statutes address the possession of
methamphetamine precursors and the possession of drug paraphernalia.
The methamphetamine precursor provision, formerly a drug severity
level 1 and now a severity level 2 felony, criminalizes the possession of
certain listed chemical ingredients of methamphetamine with an intent to
manufacture.39 The drug paraphernalia offense, a drug severity level 4
felony, criminalizes possession of paraphernalia with an intent to
manufacture or distribute drugs.4o In State v. Campbell, the Kansas
Supreme Court resolved conflicting decisions of the Kansas Court of
Appeals41 and held that these paraphernalia and precursor offenses are
36. Cf State v. Chamberlain, 120 P.3d 319, 326 (Kan. 2005) (noting that the term "conviction"
has different meanings in different statutory contexts).
37. "Under the maxim, where enumeration of specific things is followed by a more general
word or phrase, such general word or phrase is held to refer to things of the same kind, or things that
fall within the classification of the specific terms." State v. Moler, 2 P.3d 773, 775 (Kan. 2000).
38. See infra text accompanying notes 120-22.
39. § 65-7006(1) (Supp. 2007) (former version at § 65-7006(d) (2002».
40. § 65-4 I52(a)(3), (c) (Supp. 2007).
41. In State v. Frazier, a panel of the Kansas Court of Appeals held the precursor and
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the same and therefore a defendant convicted of the precursor offense
could be sentenced only for a drug severity level 4 felony.42 As in
McAdam, the court's formalistic application of the concept of identical
offenses thwarted the legislature's clear intent, and did so without
furthering any policy goal.
Campbell, which without explanation withdrew and changed the
result of an opinion the court had issued in the case a month earlier,43
appealed to the literal language of the precursor and paraphernalia
offenses. The paraphernalia offense covered not only the specific items
of paraphernalia listed in the statute but also "'products and materials of
any kind' which are intended for use in manufacturing a controlled
substance.,,44 The phrase "products and materials," the Campbell court
reasoned, encompassed the chemical ingredients enumerated in the
precursor provision.45 Because the two offenses were thus the same, the
court held that a defendant convicted of the precursor offense could be
sentenced only for paraphernalia, a drug severity level 4 felony.46
Campbell reduced the applicable guideline sentence even more
dramatically than McAdam. The precursor offense was then graded as a
drug severity level 1 felony, which carries a presumptive sentence of 146
months imprisonment for a first-time offender.47 The guidelines prefer
probation for a first-time offender who commits the paraphernalia
offense.48 As with McAdam, the legislature responded quickly, enacting
legislation to overturn Campbell.49
Use of the same offense doctrine was even less defensible in
Campbell than in McAdam. As in McAdam, its invocation clearly defied
the legislature's intent. Given that the precursors listed in section 65-
paraphernalia offenses to be the same, such that offenders convicted of the precursor offense could
be sentenced only at the drug severity level of the paraphernalia offense. 42 P.3d 188, 193 (Kan. Ct.
App. 2002). In Campbell itself, the court of appeals had declined to follow Frazier, criticizing that
decision for its subversion of legislative intent and mechanical use of the same offense doctrine.
State v. Campbell, 78 PJd 1178, 1185-86 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003), rev'd in part 106 PJd 1129 (Kan.
2005). The Campbell panel's dissatisfaction with Frazier was premised on earlier criticisms
expressed by Judge Knudson in Wilson v. State, 71 P.3d 1180, 1184-85 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003)
(Knudson, J., concurring). Campbell, 106 P.3d at 1185-86.
42. 106 PJd 1129, 1139 (Kan. 2005).
43. State v. Campbell, 101 P.3d 1179 (Kan. 2004), withdrawn, 106 P.3d 1129 (Kan. 2005).
44. Campbell, 106 PJd at 1139 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4150(c)).
45. [d.
46. Jd.
47. KAN. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 21.
48. [d.
49. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH DEP'T, CONFERENCE COMMIlTEE REpORT BRIEF: SENATE BILL
No. 366, 2006 Sess., at 2-366 (Kan. 2006), available at http://www.kslegislature.org/
supplementaI/2006/CCRB366.pdf.
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7006(a) of the Kansas Statutes are all ingredients of methamphetamine,
the legislature's intent to target methamphetamine was obvious. It was
equally obvious that the legislature chose the offense severity level
accordingly. But unlike McAdam, judicial creativity was not necessary
to effectuate the legislature's intent. To begin with, "paraphernalia" can
be interpreted to exclude the chemical ingredients of controlled
substances. None of the numerous items specifically listed in the
definition of paraphernalia is such an ingredient.50 With the exception of
cutting agents, which are not active ingredients,5l all items mentioned
involve physical equipment such as blenders, pipes, and scales. Again,
the maxim of statutory construction ejusdem generis holds that a catch-
all phrase should be limited to items that are like those specifically
enumerated.52 The general phrase "products and materials," then, easily
could be read to include physical equipment and exclude active chemical
ingredients.
Alternatively, the concept of general versus specific offenses
provides a readily available tool by which to accommodate rather than
frustrate the legislature's intent. This concept, which the Kansas
Supreme Court has relied on before,53 comes into play when there is a
generally framed offense and an offense targeting some subset of the
larger area the general offense covers. For example, one offense might
criminalize all false statements to governmental officials while another
criminalizes false statements made to government officials for purposes
of obtaining welfare benefits. It is settled law that, absent evidence to
the contrary, the legislature intends for the more specific offense to
control for purposes of charging, conviction, and punishment.
If "paraphernalia" encompasses chemical ingredients, as Campbell
holds, the general versus specific offense concept is clearly applicable.
Insofar as the paraphernalia offense prohibits possession of chemical
ingredients, it applies generally to ingredients of all controlled
substances. The precursor offense, in contrast, specifically addresses the
ingredients of one particular controlled substance, namely
methamphetamine.
The general versus specific offense doctrine is designed for just this
kind of situation. It comes into play when the legislature has determined
that some subset of conduct covered by a more general offense deserves
50. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4150(c) (Supp. 2007).
51. § 65-4150(c)(6).
52. See State v. Moler, 2 P.3d 773, 775 (Kan. 2000).
53. State v. Williams, 829 P.2d 892, 897 (Kan. 1992); State v. Wilcox, 775 P.2d 177, 178-79
(Kan. 1989).
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more or less punishment. To honor the legislature's determination, the
offender only may be charged with, convicted of, and sentenced for the
specific offense. It is well-known that methamphetamine manufacture
creates special dangers.54 Its production requires the combination of
highly flammable materials and not infrequently results in explosions
and fires. Its production also leaves a toxic residue, which can cause
injury and entail expensive clean-up. The penalty for the precursor
offense was chosen in contemplation of these specific dangers.55 It is
both natural and in harmony with the legislature's clear intent to view the
precursor offense as the offense specific to methamphetamine. On this
view, the paraphernalia offense remains available as a general offense for
those who possess ingredients intending to make drugs other than
methamphetamine such as ecstasy or LSD.
The Campbell court not only neglected to mention the general versus
specific offense doctrine, it also employed reasoning that implicitly
rejects that doctrine's very existence. The court concluded that the
paraphernalia and precursor offenses were identical simply because the
paraphernalia offense completely overlapped the precursor offense.56 Of
course, general and specific offenses also have an overlapping
relationship, with the general completely overlapping the specific
offense. The neglect and implicit rejection of the general versus specific
offense doctrine is unfortunate. That doctrine is a very useful tool for
working out the relationship between offenses in a manner that respects
legislative intent.
Like McAdam, Campbell is an exercise in legal formalism. The key
for the Campbell court was not legislative intent, the real world
consequences of its decision, or policy considerations. Instead it was the
abstract relationship between the elements of the paraphernalia and
54. See generally Jean C. O'Connor, Jamie F. Chriqui & Duane C. McBride, Developing
Lasting Legal Solutions to the Dual Epidemics ofMethamphetamine Production and Use, 82 N.D. L.
REV. 1165, 1170-73 (2006) (describing the special dangers associated with methamphetamine
manufacture).
55. The Kansas Legislature has enacted several statutory provisions targeting the special
dangers associated with methamphetamine production, thereby indicating its awareness of and desire
to punish these dangers specially. Aggravated endangerment of a child explicitly includes exposing
children to the dangers of methamphetamine production. § 21-3608a(a)(3}-(4) (2007) ("causing or
permitting such child to be in an environment where a person is selling ... [or] manufactur[ing] any
methamphetamine" (emphasis added). Arson includes "accidentally, by means of fire or explosive
as a result of manufacturing or attempting to manufacture a controlled substance ... damaging" any
dwelling, building, or property. § 21-3718(a)(2}-(3). Those who make methamphetamine are
civilly liable for the costs of the "actual cleanup or attempted cleanup and for damages for injury to,
or both, or destruction of any natural resources caused by chemicals at the site." § 65-7011(a)
(2002).
56. State v. Campbell, 106 P.3d 1129, 1139 (Kan. 2005).
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precursor offenses. In the court's eyes, this relationship had such a
strong priority that it rendered irrelevant the legislature's clear intent to
punish severely those who possess methamphetamine ingredients and
justified reducing sentences from more than twelve years imprisonment
to presumptive probation. The Campbell court did mention that the
existence of identical offenses punished at different levels can give
prosecutors unfettered charging discretion.57 Consistent with its
formalist approach, however, it evidently saw no need to establish this as
a real problem rather than a mere academic possibility. In fact, there was
no good reason to believe prosecutors had charged methamphetamine
precursor possession sometimes as a drug severity level 1 felony and
other times as a drug severity level 4 felony.
The parallels with McAdam are striking. In both cases, the Kansas
Supreme Court relied upon statutory quirks lacking any discernible
practical effect, frustrated the legislature's clear intent, reduced the
sentences for makers of methamphetamine dramatically, and neglected to
demonstrate that this reduction would meaningfully advance any policy
objective. One reasonably might question whether the extremely stiff
penalties the legislature has chosen for methamphetamine manufacture
are excessive. But whether that policy choice is correct from the
standpoint of some impartial and fully informed observer, it is within the
bounds of reasonableness. More importantly, it is certainly
constitutional.58 It is remarkable for courts to invalidate legislative
policy choices not because they are unconstitutional but rather because
their expression departs from some ideal of a formally perfect code. In
doing so, McAdam and Campbell unnecessarily create an adversarial
relationship between the court and the legislature.
C. Precursors Versus Manufacture: State v. Schoonover
One who manufactures methamphetamine necessarily possesses
essential ingredients with an intent to manufacture. Mayan offender
nonetheless be convicted of and punished for both the manufacture and
57. 1d.
58. Tom Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment Mess, 14 WM. & MARY BILL Rrs. J. 475,
499-500 (2005) ("Only once in the last several decades has the Court invalidated a sentence of
imprisonment as grossly disproportionate. During that same period, it has upheld sentences of life
imprisonment for three relatively minor property offenses, forty years' imprisonment for possession
and distribution of nine ounces of marijuana, mandatory life imprisonment without parole for a first
offense of possession of cocaine, and twenty-five years to life under California's 'three-strikes' law
for a triggering offense of stealing goods worth approximately $1,200." (footnotes omitted».
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possessing the precursor ingredients for that same manufacture? In State
v. Schoonover, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the answer is yes. 59
The court began its analysis with an extensive review of federal and
Kansas double jeopardy case law limiting punishment imposed for
multiple offenses in a single proceeding.60 It found that Kansas cases
had used two different tests. Some cases had precluded cumulative
punishment for offenses arising out of the '''same transaction. ",61 Other
cases had used a "same elements" test, precluding cumulative
punishment only when one offense possesses no elements beyond those
of the other.62 To remedy the confusion and inconsistency resulting from
the use of two different tests, the Schoonover court fashioned a two part
test. The first part asks whether the offenses arise from the same
conduct.63 If they do, the second part of the test comes into play, which
the court denominated the "same-elements test.,,64 Multiple convictions
and punishment are permissible when "one statute require[s] proof of an
element not necessary to prove the other offense.,,65
Applying its two-part test to the facts before it, the Schoonover court
affirmed the defendant's convictions for both manufacturing
methamphetamine .and possessing precursors with an intent to
manufacture. The court began by observing that both convictions were
based upon the same act, not separate acts of manufacture.66 The court
therefore turned to the second part of its test, which asks whether the
offenses have the same elements. The elements of the manufacturing
and precursor offenses, it reasoned, are different because manufacture
"requires proof of manufacturing or the ability to manufacture, while
possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine does not.,,67
This result cannot be justified as matter of policy.
Methamphetamine cannot be manufactured without possessing the
necessary ingredients. When based upon a single act of manufacture, as
in Schoonover, possession of necessary ingredients adds to neither the
harm nor the culpability already inherent in the manufacture. Additional
59. 133 P.3d 48, 81 (Kan. 2006); cf State v. Patten, 122 P.3d 350, 355 (Kan. 2005) (holding
that offenders may be convicted of both methamphetamine manufacture and possession of drug
paraphernalia with an intent to manufacture).
60. Schoonover, 133 P.3d at 60-67.
61. !d. at 68-71 (quoting State v. Freeman, 689 P.2d 885, 892 (Kan. 1984)).
62. Id. at 66-67.




67. Id at 81.
844 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
punishment for precursor possession therefore cannot be defended on the
ground that the offender deserves such as matter of rational justice. Nor
do utilitarian considerations warrant additional punishment.
In addition to authorizing the unwarranted imposition of cumulative
punishment, Schoonver's result frustrates other important criminal justice
policies. Prosecutors can charge the making of methamphetamine as
manufacture, as precursor possession, or both. Depending on the
charges, offenders sometimes will be punished for a drug severity level I
felony, other times for a drug severity level 2 felony, and other times for
both level I and level 2 felonies. When multiple offenses target separate
harms or culpability, the law requires that any increased punishment
flowing from multiple convictions be justified by a showing of additional
harm or culpability. Schoonover eliminates this important safeguard and
so raises the possibility disproportionate and/or disuniform treatment of
equally culpable offenders. One can hope that prosecutorial discretion
will be exercised wisely so that more culpable manufacturers will face
multiple charges and more severe punishment. But the assurance that is
present when multiple offenses target separate harms is lacking.
Schoonover's result ironically gives prosecutors precisely the kind of
unfettered charging discretion the Campbell court sought to exorcise
from the law.
Although Schoonover increases the potential punishment for
methamphetamine manufacture, it cannot be said that the legislature
intended this result. There is no indication that the legislature considered
the relationship between the precursor offense and methamphetamine
manufacture. Much less is there any reason to believe that a majority of
the legislators in both chambers held any particular view concerning their
interrelationship.
In fact, there is good reason to believe that if the legislature had
considered the matter it would have rejected the Schoonover's court's
view. The penalty for methamphetamine manufacture-more than
twelve years for a first-time offender-is extremely severe and is harsher
than in other sentencing guideline states.68 The available evidence
indicates that defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges often regard the
guideline punishment as unduly harsh. The available data for 2006, for
instance, indicate that downward departures were granted from the
guideline sentence applicable to drug manufacturing in approximately
eighty-five percent of cases, usually as a result of an agreement between
68. STEMEN, supra note 24.
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the defense and prosecution.69 It is also relevant that state prisons are
rapidly approaching their maximum capacity.70 In addition, legislators
presumably wish to proportion punishment to harm and culpability,
which is a fundamental aim of the criminal code and of criminal law
generally. It follows from this principle of proportionality that an
offender should not be punished for separate offenses unless those
offenses target different harm or culpability. Legislators thus have
compelling reasons to reject the imposition of cumulative punishment for
an offense targeting no additional harm.
As in McAdam and Campbell, traditional tools of legal interpretation
were available to enable the Schoonover court to reach a result
compatible with policy and the legislature's presumed intent. Because it
is impossible to manufacture methamphetamine without having been in
possession of a listed precursor, such possession is an essential, albeit
unstated, element of methamphetamine manufacture. Possession of a
listed precursor thus fits the definition of a lesser included offense: "[A]11
elements of the lesser crime are identical to some of the elements of the
crime charged ....,,71 It is settled law that, although an offender may be
charged with both a lesser and greater offense, he may not be convicted
of and punished for both. 72
Instead of making use of the concept of lesser included and greater
offenses, Schoonover adopted a same-elements test, which flatly
contradicts the statutory provision on lesser included and greater
offenses. According to Schoonover, multiple convictions and
punishment are permissible so long as "one statute require[s] proof of an
element not necessary to prove the other offense.,,73 Lesser included and
greater offenses, of course, satisfy this test: the greater offense by
definition requires proof of an element the lesser offense does not.
Contrary to Schoonover, section 21-3107 of the Kansas Statutes
explicitly provides that a defendant may not be convicted of-and,
hence, punished for-both a lesser included and a greater offense.74
69. KAN. SENTENCING COMM'N, FY 2006 ANNUAL REpORT 56, 57 tbl.24 (2007), available at
http://www.accesskansas.orglksc/2006annual.shtml.
70. The Kansas Department of Corrections 2007 Annual Report reported that, based on the
Sentencing Commission's projections, "the department's capacity for male inmates of 8,674 ... will
be exceeded by the end of FY 2008 ...." 2007 KANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS ANNUAL
REPORT 1 (2007), available at http://www.dc.state.ks.us/publicationslRevised%20Annual%
20Report.pdf.
71. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3107(2)(b) (2007).
72. § 21-3107(2) ("[T)he defendant may be convicted of either the crime charged or a lesser
included crime, but not both.").
73. State v. Schoonover, 133 P.3d 48, 80 (Kan. 2006).
74. It is ironic that the court's same-elements test conflicts with section 21-3107. The court
846 KANSAS LAW REvIEW [Vol. 56
Like McAdam and Campbell, Schoonover may be criticized for
practicing a version of legal formalism that ignores social reality, policy
concerns, and legislative intent. It treats as legally irrelevant the reality
that methamphetamine cannot be manufactured without possessing the
ingredients listed in the precursor offense.75 Yet Schoonover made no
attempt to explain why the purposes of criminal punishment supported
this result. Nor did the court discuss legislative intent. These very same
flaws underlie Schoonover's additional holdings that, based on the same
act, offenders may be punished for both methamphetamine manufacture
and methamphetamine possession76 and for both methamphetamine
manufacture and possession of drug paraphernalia with an intent to
manufacture. 77
relied upon that provision in part as a basis for rejecting the single act of violence test employed in
some prior decisions. State v. Schoonover, 133 P.3d 48, 78 (Kan. 2006). The court appears to have
confused different aspects of whether offenses are "the same." McAdam and Campbell held offenses
to be identical such that the offender could be punished only under the more lenient penalty
provision. For this purpose, Schoonover's same-element test makes sense. It requires that the two
offenses have identical elements. Schoonover, however, equates the issue of whether offenses are
identical in this sense with the issue of whether multiple punishments may be imposed. A
conclusion that an offense is not identical in the sense McAdam and Campbell have in mind does not
imply that multiple punishments may be imposed. Consistent with long established law, section 21-
3107 provides that an offender may not be punished both for a greater and a lesser included offense.
Of course, lesser included and greater offenses do not have identical elements because the greater
offense by definition has one or more elements the lesser does not.
The so-called Blockburger test, which is drawn from the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), is better-suited than the same-elements test to
answer whether multiple punishments may be imposed. The Blockburger Court addressed whether
the defendant could be validly convicted and punished for two narcotics offenses. It declared: "The
applicable rule is that, where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct
statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is
whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not." Jd. at 304. Under this
test, a defendant may not be punished for both a lesser included and a greater offense because the
lesser offense does not require proof of a fact which the greater does not. Prior Kansas Supreme
Court decisions addressing whether multiple convictions and punishment may be imposed had
utilized the Blockburger test. See, e.g., State v. Panen, 122 P.3d 350, 353 (Kan. 2005).
75. Schoonover explicitly rejected the defense's argument that possession of methamphetamine
is a lesser included offense of manufacturing methamphetamine. 133 P.3d at 83-84. It is not clear
whether the basis of this holding is a mechanical application of the same-elements test, which
erroneously permits multiple punishments to be imposed for lesser and greater offenses, see supra
note 74, or a conclusion that it is legally irrelevant that methamphetamine cannot be manufactured
without possession of the completed product because this is not formally acknowledged in the stated
elements of the manufacturing offense. Particularly given the significance of the consequences for
affected individuals, the prison system, and the coherence of the code, it is impossible to understand
why this undeniable reality should be treated as legally irrelevant.
76. Schoonover, 133 P.3d at 8Q.-SI.
77. ld. at SI.
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D. Attempted Manufacture Versus Precursor and Paraphernalia
Offenses
The cases addressing the relationship between attempted
manufacture and the precursor and paraphernalia offenses are
inconsistent with one another. Schoonover holds that an offender may be
convicted of and punished for both manufacture and the precursor
offense.7s A formalistic application of Schoonover's same-elements test
would seem to lead to the same conclusion respecting attempted
manufacture and the precursor offense. While both attempted
manufacture and the precursor offense require an intent to manufacture,
attempted manufacture may be based upon any overt acts, not just
precursor possession, and those acts must go beyond mere preparation.79
Given that the offense elements are not the same, Schoonover's same-
elements test would permit multiple punishment.
In State v. Stevens, however, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the
defendant's convictions for attempted manufacture and the precursor
offense were multiplicitous.so Instead of the same-elements test applied
in Schoonover, the Stevens court applied the test drawn from the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Blockburger v. United States.SI The
Blockburger test permits multiple punishments for separate statutory
offenses when "each offense requires proof of an element not necessary
to prove the other."s2 The Blockburger test differs from Schoonover's
same-elements test. The same-elements test permits multiple
punishments if one offense has an element the other does not. Under
Blockburger, multiple punishments are permissible only if both offenses
have an element the other does not. Under a same-elements test,
multiple punishments could be imposed for battery and aggravated
battery, because aggravated battery has an element that battery does not.
In contrast, Blockburger would preclude multiple punishments because
battery has no element that aggravated battery does not.
The Stevens court applied the Blockburger test with reference to the
facts adduced at trial rather than the offenses' abstract elements. The
78. Jd.
79. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3301(a) (2007) ("An attempt is any overt act toward the perpetration
of a crime done by a person who intends to commit such crime but fails in the perpetration thereof or
is prevented or intercepted in executing such crime.").
80. 101 P.3d 1190, 1196 (Kan. 2004).
81. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
82. 101 P.3d at 1195; stockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
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prosecution had argued to the jury that the overt act required for attempt
liability was established by evidence of the defendant's ephedrine
possession.83 This same evidence was used to establish the defendant's
guilt of the precursor offense.84 The Stevens court held that, at least on
the particular facts of the case, the offenses' elements were insufficiently
distinct and the defendant could not be convicted of and punished for
both.85 Although Stevens was handed down a couple of years prior to
Schoonover's 2006 decision, Schoonover did not address the
inconsistency between the same-elements test it adopted and the result in
Stevens.
State v. Fanning,86 a decision subsequent to both Stevens and
Schoonover, addressed the relationship between attempted manufacture
and possession of paraphernalia with an intent to manufacture. The issue
in Fanning was not whether the defendant could be convicted of and
punished for both offenses. The defendant had been convicted only of
attempted manufacture, a drug severity level I felony.87 Instead, at issue
was whether attempted manufacture and paraphernalia possession with
an intent to manufacture constitute identical offenses such that,
consistent with the logic of McAdam and Campbell, offenders guilty of
attempted manufacture must be punished at the drug severity level 4
applicable to the paraphernalia offense.88 The court held that the
offenses were not identical and that the defendant could be punished for
a level I felony.89
The Fanning court based its conclusion on the same-elements test. It
acknowledged that previous cases had applied the same-elements test in
two different ways. One line of cases, which included Schoonover,
looked to offense elements in the abstract.9o Other cases applied the test
with reference to the facts of the particular case. 91 The Fanning court
sought to reconcile these two lines of cases. It explained that the abstract
approach applies when the issue is whether the defendant may be
83. Stevens, 101 PJd at 1196.
84. [d.
85. [d.
86. 135 PJd 1067 (Kan. 2006).
87. [d. at 1069.
88. [d. at 1068.
89. Id. at 1072; cf State v. Cooper, 179 PJd 439, 441 (Kan. 2008) (holding that
methamphetamine manufacture and possession of paraphernalia with an intent to manufacture are
not identical offenses and that offenders convicted of manufacture may be sentenced for such rather
than pursuant to the more lenient penalty for the paraphernalia offense).
90. Fanning, 135 PJd at 1071.
91. [d.
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convicted of two offenses.92 The fact-based approach governs when the
issue is whether the two offenses are identical such that the defendant
may be sentenced only at the less severe offense level.93 Finding the
issue in Fanning to be of the latter type, the court purported to apply the
fact-based approach. Listing the elements of the two offenses, it
concluded that the two were not the same because attempted manufacture
requires that the manufacture be incomplete, and the paraphernalia
offense has no such element.94
Several features of Fanning deserve praise. The court reached the
correct result. The legislature clearly intends for attempted
methamphetamine manufacture to be treated as a drug severity level I
felony rather than as a level 4 felony that carries presumptive probation
for most criminal history scores.95 In addition, the Fanning court
helpfully acknowledged a division in the court's cases over whether to
consider offense elements in the abstract generally or in light of the
particular facts adduced at trial. Most helpful of all, the Fanning court
distinguished between two separate issues: first, whether offenses are
identical such that the more lenient penalty provision governs, and,
second, whether multiple convictions and punishments may be imposed.
Schoonover conflated these two issues and erroneously adopted the
same-elements test for resolution of the latter issue, which contradicts
section 21-3107's provisions regarding greater and lesser included
offenses.96 Fanning unfortunately did not distinguish the two issues for
purposes of determining whether to apply a same-elements test or the
Blockburger test. Nonetheless, drawing a distinction between issues of
offense identity and multiple punishments is a step in the right direction.
Whether offenses are identical, general and specific, greater and lesser,
or otherwise permit multiple punishment raise different issues and
require'a different analysis.
Despite its commendable features, Fanning employs analysis that is
in some respects seriously confused. First, it is inconsistent with Stevens
in both approach and result. Because the issue in Stevens was whether
the defendant could be convicted of and punished for two offenses,
Fanning would require use of the abstract elements test. Stevens,
however, used the fact-based approach by considering the elements in
light of the evidence presented at trial. Had Stevens used the abstract
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1072.
95. See infra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
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approach, it would have reached a different result. Considered in light of
abstract elements, attempted manufacture and the precursor offense each
possess an element the other does not. Attempted manufacture requires
overt action going beyond preparation while the precursor offense does
not. The precursor offense requires possession of specific ingredients
while attempted manufacture does not. It follows from the same-
elements test that an offender may be punished for both.
Second, the Fanning court did not use a fact-based approach. It
considered the elements of attempted manufacture and the paraphernalia
offense in the abstract and did not discuss the evidence that had been
adduced at trial to establish those elements. Third, although the Fanning
court characterized McAdam and Campbell as using a fact-based
approach, neither of those cases focused on the degree of overlap in the
evidence adduced at trial to prove two putatively separate offenses.
E. Summary
The Kansas Supreme Court's decisions regarding relating Kansas
offenses are problematic on a number of grounds. Decisions such as
McAdam and Campbell subvert the legislature's clear intent. They do so
without furthering any identifiable constitutional value or criminal justice
policy. A number of the decisions are inconsistent with one another in
reasoning or result. The same-elements test, which Schoonover intends
as a comprehensive mechanism for resolving issues of both offense
identity and multiple punishments, flatly conflicts with section 21-3107's
provisions on lesser included and greater offenses. The various problems
in large measure are traceable to an approach that bears affinity with the
legal formalism in vogue in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. This approach relies on formal offense elements and
mechanical tests, and discounts legislative intent, policy considerations,
and even undeniable features of social reality as irrelevant.
III. AWAY FROM FORMALISM
This Part outlines an alternative method for relating offenses, one
which assigns a central role to legislative intent and criminal justice
policies as incorporated into the criminal code. It seeks to replace the
Kansas Supreme Court's legal formalism with an approach rooted in the
legal process school, which emerged in the mid-twentieth century from
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the legal realists' withering critiques of fonnalism. 97 The approach
outlined in this Part follows the legal process school's emphasis on
statutory purpose as an essential guide to legislative intent.98 Offense
elements remain relevant but are analyzed in a more nuanced fashion and
placed within a larger, more particularized framework designed to
advance the ultimate purposes of the criminal code. Unlike the
framework proffered by the Kansas Supreme Court in Schoonover, the
framework outlined here does not use a single test to answer all issues
pertaining to offense interrelationships. It instead distinguishes the issue
of whether multiple convictions and punishments may be imposed from
the separate issue of whether use of a particular offense is required. This
framework urges outright rejection of the identical offenses concept
invoked in cases such as McAdam and Campbell. After describing the
main features of the proposed framework, this Part shows how the
framework applies to a number of issues.
A. An Approach for Relating Offenses
This section begins the task of sketching an alternative approach by
identifying considerations that bear on the proper relationship between
the judiciary and the legislature. The overriding role of courts in this
area, it maintains, is to work in hannony with the legislature, not in
opposition to it. The section then discusses how courts might best
establish such a collaborative and mutually supportive relationship,
particularly in light of the reality that the legislature typically does not
consider offense interrelationship issues.
1. The Judicial Role
Any approach for relating offenses should be based upon a
considered assessment of the role of the courts relative to the legislature.
An important starting point is the recognition that the courts' role in this
context does not consist of enforcing constitutional constraints against
legislative desires. None of the cases discussed in Part II raises the issue
of whether an offender may be tried for multiple offenses in separate
proceedings, thereby implicating constitutional double jeopardy
limitations. They all involve the validity of convictions and punishment
97. See generally Michael Wells, Who's Afraid of Henry Hart?, 14 CaNST. COMMENT. 175
(1997) (reviewing HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM (1953)).
98. See supra note 17.
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imposed in a single proceeding. The United States Supreme Court has
held that, in such circumstances, double jeopardy precludes only the
imposition of punishment beyond that which the legislature intends.99 In
determining whether the legislature intended to permit an offender to be
punished for two offenses, the Court has looked to the Blockburger
test. 100 It is true that the Blockburger test also applies when considering
whether double jeopardy's ban against being twice put in jeopardy for
the "same offense" permits an offender to be tried in separate
proceedings for given offenses. JOJ However, when the issue concerns
convictions and punishment imposed in a single proceeding, the
Blockburger test functions merely as a presumption as to what the
legislature intends. If the legislature wishes to permit an offender to be
convicted of and punished for offenses that would constitute the "same
offense" under Blockburger, constitutional double jeopardy does not
stand in the way. In this context, the Constitution thus permits what the
legislature intends.
Given that the area is not pervasively structured by constitutional
limits, courts should work cooperatively with the legislature to facilitate
the results and policies it intends. Courts, of course, have a recognized
and accepted role of defying legislative intent to enforce constitutional
constraints. More controversially, courts sometimes deliberately
overlook actual legislative intent and construct a fictitious intent when
the legislature treads perilously close to unconstitutionality or
irrationality. When, as here, these roles are not implicated, courts do and
should work harmoniously with the legislature. The legislature properly
has its eye on the big picture and the resolution of basic policy choices.
Courts are tasked with applying general statutory terms and policy
choices to highly particularized issues and facts the legislature did not
specifically contemplate. In so doing, courts try to support and
rationalize the legislature's product by filling in its details in a manner
that advances the legislature's basic policy choices. Cases such as
McAdam and Campbell, which thwart the Kansas Legislature's clear
intent, undermine the harmony between the judicial and legislative
branches that ought to characterize this area.
99. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 (1984); Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359,367 (1983);
State v. Schoonover, 133 P.3d 48, 62--{)5 (Kan. 2006); see Anne Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy
and Multiple Punishment: CUlling the Gordian Knot, 77 U. COLO. L. REv. 595, 597 (2006);
Antkowiak, supra note 10, at 263--64; Hoffheimer, supra note 9, at 400-01.
100. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779 (\985); Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684,
690--9\ (1980).
101. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 688 (1993).
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The courts' supportive role must be structured in light of the reality
that the legislature frequently has not considered the relationship
between offenses it has enacted. The paraphernalia possession offense,
which criminalizes the possession of drug paraphernalia with an intent to
distribute or manufacture, is illustrative. This offense is part of a
package of offenses found in the Model Drug Paraphernalia Act drafted
by the United States Drug Enforcement Administration. 102 The Act's
principal aim, reflected in offenses that criminalize the sale of drug
paraphernalia, was to expand the criminal liability of "head shops" and
other vendors selling material "which promotes, even glamorizes, the
illegal use of drugs by adults and children alike."I03 The Act accordingly
expands the liability of such vendors beyond principles of accomplice
liability and conspiracy by departing from the high level of culpability
thereby required. It broadens vendor liability by creating crimes for
manufacture and delivery of paraphernalia for a vendor who knows or
has reason to know it will be used in connection with illegal drugs. 104
The Act also creates the paraphernalia possession offense. But, unlike its
discussion of the vendor offenses, the Act's commentary does not
discuss the function of the paraphernalia offense. Much less does it
address that offense's relationship to other drug offenses such as
attempted manufacture, attempted distribution, manufacture, or
distribution. Nor is there any indication that in adopting the Act, the
Kansas Legislature gave any consideration to these offense relationship
issues.
Section 21-3107 of the Kansas Statutes, the general statutory
provision addressing offense interrelationships, does not provide a
comprehensive set of answers. 105 Subsection (1) addresses when a
person may be charged with multiple offenses. It provides that when a
person's conduct establishes "more than one crime," he "may be
102. MODEL DRUG PARAPHERNALIA ACT (Drug Enforcement Admin. 1979), reprinted in Steven
E. Gersten, Drug Paraphernalia: J/Iustrative of the Need for Federal-State Cooperation in Law
Enforcement in an Era ofNew Federalism, 26 Sw. U. L. REv. 1067 app. A (1997).
103. ld. at prefatory note, reprinted in Gersten, supra note 102, app. A, at 1109.
104. Id. at art. II, § B, reprinted in Gersten, supra note 102, app. A, at 1113. The general rule is
that a vendor is not guilty as an accomplice or as a co-conspirator for selling a product he knows will
be put to an illegal use. A greater level of culpability, namely an active stake in the success of the
criminal venture, is generally required. See United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 210--11 (1940);
United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 403 (2d Cir. 1938). The Act's offenses, by contrast, expand
the vendor's liability by diminishing the required culpability so that it encompasses not only
knowledge but also negligence.
105. Cf Michael T. Cahill, Offense Grading and Multiple Liability: New Challenges for a Model
Penal Code Second, I OHIO. ST. J. CRIM. L. 599, 604 (2004) ("No state has yet enacted a clear and
comprehensive statute that sets out in detail an underlying basis or practical method for punishing
multiple offenses.").
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prosecuted for each of such crimes.,,106 As for whether a person may be
convicted of and punished for multiple offenses, subsection (2) singles
out greater and lesser included offenses. It declares that a person may
not be convicted of and punished for both a greater and a lesser included
offense.
The Kansas Supreme Court implicitly has declined to read section
21-3107 as establishing a comprehensive blueprint for determining
relations between offenses. Unlike the Model Penal Code and many
state codes, section 21-3107 does not incorporate the concept of general
and specific offenses. iO? Read as establishing a comprehensive set of
rules for determining offense interrelatonships, it would remove that
concept from Kansas law. Subsection (2) would stand as a lesser-
included-offense exception to an unstated general rule that a person may
be convicted of multiple offenses. Given that the provision contains no
exception for general and specific offenses, it would follow that a person
may be convicted of and punished for both a "general" and "specific"
offense. This result is contrary to the accepted rule that a person may be
convicted of and punished for only the more specific offense.
Furthermore, subsection (1), which permits prosecution for all multiple
offenses, would contradict the rule that a person may be charged only
with the specific offense and not the general offense. The Kansas
Supreme Court has not read section 21-3107 in this fashion. It has
treated the general versus specific offense doctrine as part of Kansas law
and has relied upon it. 108 Treating section 21-3107 as providing the sole
source of law concerning offense interrelationships would also
undermine the concept of identical offenses, upon which McAdam and
Campbell rely. Because such offenses are not greater and lesser included
106. In pertinent part, section 21-3107 provides:
(I) When the same conduct of a defendant may establish the commission of more than
one crime under the laws of this state, the defendant may be prosecuted for each of such
crimes. Each of such crimes may be alleged as a separate count in a single complaint,
information or indictment.
(2) Upon prosecution for a crime, the defendant may be convicted of either the crime
charged or a lesser included crime, but not both. A lesser included crime is:
(a) A lesser degree of the same crime;
(b) a crime where all elements of the lesser crime are identical to some of the elements
of the crime charged;
(c) an attempt to commit the crime charged; or
an attempt to commit a crime defined under subsection (2)(a) or (2)(b).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3107(1)-(2)(2007).
107. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(1)(d) (1962); see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-110(a)(4) (West
1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 556.041(3) (West 1999).
108. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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offenses, it follows from the text of section 21-3107 that an offender may
be punished for either or both.
The court is correct in declining to read section 21-3107 as an all-
encompassing charter for determining offense interrelationships. The
general versus specific doctrine is well established. There is no reason to
believe that the legislature has even considered removing it from Kansas
law, much less made a deliberate decision to do so. Section 21-3107 is
better read not as providing a comprehensive set of directions, but rather
as codifying some settled rules regarding offense interrelationship.
Included in these are the rules that a person may not be punished for both
a greater and lesser included offense and that an attempt merges with the
completed offense. The Kansas Supreme Court has properly read section
21-3107 as leaving other issues concerning offense interrelationship to
the courts.
2. Implementation of the Legislature's Design
Courts face a dilemma. Given that the Constitution gives legislatures
great leeway, the courts must determine the permissibility of multiple
convictions and punishments with reference to legislative intent. But the
legislature generally has not addressed the matter. Faced with this
conundrum, what should courts do?
The short answer, which is developed more fully below, is that
courts should cultivate a common law of offense interrelationships that is
designed to facilitate and rationalize the legislature's basic aims. The
common law approach is particularly necessary in this area. Offense
interrelationships entail just the kind of careful discrimination of issues
and attention to case-by-case context that is uniquely suited to the
judicial competence. In developing a common law of offense
interrelationships, courts do not and should not stand on their own, much
less in opposition to the legislature. Instead, they can be guided first by
the overall aims of the criminal code, particularly the code's implicit
principle of proportionality, and second by offense relationship doctrines.
The general versus specific offense doctrine, for instance, is not formally
part of the code. It nonetheless can be applied to facilitate the
legislature's policy judgments and make the code more coherent. This is
precisely the kind of sensitivity to context and statutory purpose that the
legal process approach recommends and that a formalist approach
inhibits, if not condemns.
Before more specificity is added to this positive vision, an important
point must be made about what courts should not do. What they should
not do is use an approach that, by design or in effect, mechanically
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mInImIZeS judicial involvement. A minimalist approach makes
considerable sense when courts must decide whether to overturn
legislative preferences on constitutional grounds. The Blockburger test,
which permits multiple punishments for different offenses so long as
each contains an element the other does not, exemplifies such an
approach. It strikes a balance between separation of powers and
federalism values, which argue for giving legislatures leeway, and
double jeopardy values, which argue for limiting legislatures in the name
of individual freedom. The Blockburger test strikes a balance between
these competing constitutional values in a way that maximizes legislative
authority over the criminal law and minimizes federal interference with
state criminal justice systems.'09 The test is designed for the situation
where the legislature's desires are known and courts must determine
whether to set them aside in the name of individual rights guaranteed by
the U.S. Constitution. Schoonover's same-elements test, which permits
multiple punishments for even greater and lesser included offenses,
minimizes the judicial role to an even greater degree.
The Blockburger test, and even more so the same-elements test,
reflexively stack the deck in favor of multiple convictions and
punishments. Such an indiscriminate, across-the-board presumption
cannot be justified as reflecting a considered legislative judgment. This
is particularly so in a state such as Kansas, which must balance its budget
while striving to keep its taxes low and which is confronted with a prison
system nearing capacity. Indeed, the Schoonover court justified adoption
of the same-elements test for general purpose use on grounds of certainty
and consistency, not legislative intent. liO
When the legislature's wishes are uncertain and a court's role
nonetheless consists in identifying and enforcing those wishes,
minimization of judicial oversight prevents courts from performing a
useful and needed function. Fixing the relationship between offenses
involves nuanced and context-dependent legal issues that legislatures
109. See Poulin, supra note 99, at 603 ("The Btockburger test is not a protective test.").
110. See State v. Schoonover, 133 P.3d 48,77-78 (Kan. 2006) (listing reasons for adopting the
same-elements test); State v. Patten, 122 P.3d 350, 355 (Kan. 2005) (applying the Btockburger test
with reference to abstract offense elements rather than trial evidence in each particular case because
of this approach's "ease of application and, hence, certainty."). The court did mention legislative
intent as one of several reasons for rejecting what it called the "single act of violence/merger
doctrine." Schoonover, 133 P.3d at 78. If one views the only available choices as between the
same-elements test and the same act of violence test, then the court did opt for the same-elements
test partly based on legislative intent. Of course, these are not the only two choices so that rejection
of single act of violence test does not imply support for the same-elements test, particularly
respecting all offense interrelationship issues.
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typically have not specifically addressed and that are particularly well-
suited to judicial resolution.
Courts can playa constructive and supportive role relative to the
legislature even and perhaps especially when the legislature has not
supplied any specific direction. Courts can effectuate legislative intent
by using the overarching aims of the criminal code. The Kansas
Legislature presumably wishes for ambiguities in the statutes it enacts to
be resolved in accordance with the statutes' objectives. It is accordingly
a standard technique of legal interpretation for courts to consult statutory
purposes. Because the issues at stake involve interpreting the
interrelationship of different statutory provisions, courts of necessity
must look beyond the four comers of those particular provisions to see
how they can and do fit together as part of a coherent code. One
fundamental purpose of a criminal code is to prescribe punishment
proportionate to both actual or threatened harm and the offender's
culpability for it. III This principle of proportioned punishment furnishes
an essential guide to courts interpreting the intended interrelationship
between offenses.
In considering the implications of this principle, courts must
discriminate carefully among the numerous separate issues posed by
offense interrelationship and the doctrines designed to address these
issues. The issue that McAdam and Campbell address is whether two
offenses are "identical" such that an offender may be punished only for
the offense carrying the more lenient penalty. Another issue is whether a
person may be prosecuted for only one particular offense, an issue
addressed by the general versus specific offense doctrine. A final issue
concerns whether a person may be prosecuted, convicted, and punished
for two overlapping offenses, an issue addressed in part by the lesser
included offense doctrine. This necessary separation of issues is implicit
in offense relationship doctrines, such as those involving lesser versus
greater offenses and general versus specific offenses, and counts as a
strong reason supporting their intelligent use.
In outlining its approach in Schoonover, the Kansas Supreme Court
did not sufficiently discriminate among distinct issues. Schoonover
suggests that one test should apply across the board to all of the issues
mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Schoonover identifies that all-
Ill. This principle is fundamental and pervades the entire code. It explains why intentional
murder is treated as a more serious offense than the intentional infliction of great bodily harm even
though both offenses require intentional wrongdoing. It explains why intentional murder is treated
as a more serious offense than reckless involuntary manslaughter even though both involve the same
harm. Innumerable other examples could be given.
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purpose test as the same-elements test, which pennits multiple
punishments so long as "one statute require[s] proof of an element not
necessary to prove the other offense.,,112 In embracing the same-
elements test, the Schoonover court perhaps had cases such as McAdam
and Campbell in mind,113 where the issue was whether two offenses are
identical such that the more lenient penalty provision governs. The
same-elements test, however, is inadequate for all purposes. The most
glaring problem is that it pennits convictions and punishments for both a
lesser included and a greater offense, contrary to the dictates of section
21-3107 of the Kansas Statutes. 114 Another problem is that it leaves no
room for the doctrine of general versus specific offenses.
Nor can the Blockburger test suffice for all purposes. That test
prohibits multiple convictions and punishments unless each offense has
an element the other does not. 115 Of particular relevance to the McAdam
and Campbell line of cases, the Blockburger test does not differentiate
identical from lesser included offenses. Both "identical" and lesser
included offenses flunk this test. Yet, while Blockburger rules out
multiple convictions and punishments for both types of offenses, it does
not answer whether the more lenient penalty provision governs.
McAdam and Campbell hold that when offenses are identical, the lesser
penalty provision must be used as the basis for sentencing. Of course, an
offender who is guilty of both a lesser included and a greater offense
may be punished for the greater offense.
The Blockburger test also does not separate lesser included from
specific offenses and is not designed to address or answer the question of
whether a particular offense controls. Like lesser included and greater
offenses, specific and general offenses may flunk the Blockburger test.
Fraud, for instance, has no elements beyond those required by the more
specific offense of securities fraud. Under Blockburger, an offender may
not be convicted of and punished for both. But when one offense is a
more specific version of another, the general versus specific offense
doctrine holds that he may be charged with, convicted of, and punished
for only the more specific of these two offenses. 116 A legislature, for
instance, rationally may conclude that securities fraud
112. State v. Schoonover, 133 P.3d 48, 80 (Kan. 2006).
113. /d. at 82-83 (mentioning McAdam and Campbell in aspects of the opinion other than
adoption of the same-elements test).
114. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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deserves a greater penalty than fraud because such an offense tends to
have multiple victims and undermine the capital market.
Mechanical elements tests can be useful tools. But they must be
used in conjunction with other considerations as part of a larger
framework. This framework must carefully discriminate between lesser
included and greater offenses, which pertains to the issue of whether an
offender may be convicted of and punished for multiple offenses, and
general versus specific offenses, which pertains to the issue of whether
the legislature intends for a particular offense to exclude others. The
analysis of offense elements differs depending on which doctrine is at
issue. The concepts of lesser included versus greater offenses and
specific versus general offenses are well established and designed to
adjust offense interrelationships in a manner consistent with legislative
intent. Courts should consider their applicability. Ultimately, of course,
offense elements and offense relationship doctrines must be used to
effectuate legislative intent.
While deference to legislative intent counsels judicious use of lesser
included and general versus specific offense doctrines, it compels
rejection of the McAdam/Campbell understanding of identical offenses.
McAdam and Campbell hold that when two offenses possess exactly the
same elements, sentencing courts must use the more lenient penalty
provision even when the offender has been convicted of the other
offense. A hard and fast rule that the more lenient penalty controls
cannot be squared with the courts' duty to defer to legislative intent.
Identical offenses carrying different penalty provisions may exist for at
least two reasons. First, the legislature might have been unaware of an
identical offense already on the books. If the more recently enacted
offense carries a more severe penalty, applying the more lenient penalty
provision would unjustifiably subvert the legislature's intent. According
to the principle that "[w]hen a conflict exists, the most recent enactment
controls,,,11? obeisance to legislative intent would require that the more
severe penalty contro1. 118
117. State v. Whitesell, 33 P.3d 865, 868 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001).
118. One might argue that the principle of lenity, which resolves ambiguities in criminal statutes
in favor of the defendant, necessitates use of the more lenient penalty provision. On this view, there
is ambiguity about which penalty provision controls so that lenity requires use of the lesser penalty.
In United States v. Batchelder, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected such an argument. 442 U.S. 114
(1979). The defendant had been charged, convicted, and sentenced pursuant to the statute containing
the harsher penalty provision. The Court declared: "[T]here is no ambiguity to resolve. Respondent
unquestionably violated [the statute, which] unquestionably permits five years' imprisonment for
such a violation. That [another statute] provides different penalties for essentially the same conduct
is no justification for taking liberties with unequivocal statutory language." [d. at 121-22.
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Second, the legislature may enact identical offenses to increase
prosecutorial charging discretion. Courts must honor this legislative
intent. Although there are good policy arguments against expanding
prosecutorial discretion in this way, the Constitution does not preclude it.
In United States v. Batchelder, 119 the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously
dispatched the argument that the existence of identical offenses carrying
different penalties violates the Constitution by giving prosecutors
unfettered charging discretion or an improper sentencing role. The Court
reasoned: "[T]here is no appreciable difference between the discretion a
prosecutor exercises when deciding whether to charge under one of two
statutes with different elements and the discretion he exercises when
choosing one of two statutes with identical elements.,,'2o As the Kansas
Supreme Court observed in Campbell, the existence of identical offenses
with different penalties expands prosecutorial discretion. 121 In light of
the unequivocal holding in Batchelder, however, that fact does not justify
courts in declining to follow the unambiguous terms of the statute-
substantive elements and penalty provisions alike-pursuant to which the
offender was charged and convicted. The approach urged here thus
necessitates rejection of the understanding of identical offenses at work
in cases such as McAdam and Campbell.
In summary, courts have a needed and constructive role to play in
determining offense interrelationships. Given the absence of pervasive
constitutional constraints, courts should base their determinations
ultimately on an appraisal of the legislature's intent. It is true that the
legislature generally will not have addressed the issue at hand directly.
But the reality that legislative intent often cannot be ascertained easily or
mechanically does not justify dispensing with the enterprise altogether.
It certainly does not warrant formalistic use of mechanical tests and
statutory text in a way that subverts any reasonable appraisal of the
legislature's design. Courts instead should make use of the powerful
tools available for ascertaining legislative intent and rationalizing the
code, such as the principle of proportioned punishment and offense
relationship doctrines.
119. 442 u.s. 114 (1979).
120. Id. at 125. Of course, a prosecutor may not exercise charging discretion based upon
constitutionally impennissible criteria such as race or religion. Id. at 125 n.9.
121. State v. Campbell, 106 P.3d 1129,1137-39 (Kan. 2005).
2008]
B. Applications
RELATING KANSAS OFFENSES 861
This section applies the approach outlined in the preceding section to
a number of issues involving the interrelationship of drug offenses. The
approach uses reasoning that differs significantly from that employed by
the Kansas Supreme Court and, as this section shows, frequently leads to
a different result.
1. McAdam and Campbell
In McAdam and Campbell, the Kansas Supreme Court invoked the
concept of same offenses in a way that reduced the guideline sentence for
those involved in making methamphetamine by more than ten years. In
so doing, these decisions conflicted with the Kansas Legislature's clearly
expressed intent to single this activity out and punish it harshly. The
approach here reveals that McAdam and Campbell frustrate legislative
intent on a deeper level. That approach asks courts to rely on the
fundamental background principle of punishment proportioned to harm
and culpability as a guide to legislative intent. Methamphetamine
manufacture creates special harms not associated with other drugs. 122 In
dramatically reducing penalties for those who are culpable for creating
such harms, McAdam and Campbell undermined the principle of
proportioned punishment. The legislature presumably wishes to honor
this principle, which structures the entire code.
The approach here counsels courts to use tools of interpretation to
advance rather than frustrate legislative wishes. Part II explained how
the traditional techniques of interpretation, including the general versus
specific offense doctrine, can be employed to accomplish this result. 123
McAdam and Campbell decline to follow the legislature's intent for
reasons that are insufficient. Part II argues that those cases wrongly
concluded that the offenses in question were identical. Even assuming
that those cases rightly characterized the relationship as one of identity,
there was no warrant for holding that the more lenient penalty provision
controls both offenses. As the preceding section argued, the
McAdam/Campbell conception of identical offenses is unacceptable.
Campbell cited the need to avoid "unfettered prosecutorial discretion,,124
122. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
124. Campbell, 106 P.3d at 1139.
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as grounds for reqUITIng use of the lesser penalty. Of course, the
existence of such discretion was merely an abstract possibility, not a
demonstrated reality.125 More importantly, the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Batchelder makes clear that even the reality of prosecutorial
discretion arising from identical offenses does not violate the
Constitution. 126 Absent unconstitutionality, the approach proposed here
requires courts to enforce legislative desires that are clearly expressed
and implicit in the principle of proportioned punishment.
2. Manufacture Versus Precursors and Paraphernalia
In Schoonover, the Kansas Supreme Court held that based on a
single act of manufacture a person may be convicted of and punished for
both manufacturing methamphetamine and possessing precursors with an
intent to manufacture. '27 In contrast with the situation in Campbell and
McAdam, there was no clear and specific evidence of a legislatively
intended relationship between these two offenses. By permitting
multiple punishments in the absence of additional harm or culpability,
Schoonover's holding nonetheless violates the principle of proportioned
punishment. That principle is a primary aim of the criminal code, and
one which the legislature presumably wishes to further.
The approach outlined in the previous section urges courts to use
offense relationship doctrines as a means for implementing the principle
of proportioned punishment and, hence, legislative intent. The lesser
included offense doctrine relates manufacture and the precursor offense
in just this way. This conclusion can be reached through both the
Blockburger test and section 21-3107 of the Kansas Statutes, which
define a lesser offense as one containing some but not all elements of the
greater offense and no elements beyond those of the greater. Because the
precursor offense does not require the making of methamphetamine to
have actually begun, it does not require all elements of manufacture. The
precursor offense, the lesser, requires some of the elements implicitly
required by manufacture, the greater. In particular, both offenses require
125. See supra text accompanying note 57.
126. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
127. An issue not discussed in the text is whether manufacture and the precursor or
paraphernalia offenses are identical for purposes of the McAdam and Campbell line of cases. Under
the approach proposed here, they are not. This approach rejects the McAdam/Campbell conception
of identical offenses. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text. In State v. Cooper, the
Kansas Supreme Court distinguished rather than repudiated McAdam and Campbell. 179 P.3d 439,
441-42 (Kan. 2008). It nonetheless reached the correct result in holding that manufacture and the
paraphernalia offense are not identical.
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possession of ingredients essential to methamphetamine manufacture and
an intent to manufacture. It should not matter that manufacture requires
possession of necessary ingredients as a matter of practical reality rather
than as a formally stated element. To overlook this obvious reality
would serve no useful purpose and, in fact, would needlessly frustrate the
principle of proportioned punishment and, hence, legislative intent.
Deciding the proper relationship between the paraphernalia offense
and manufacture is more difficult. Methamphetamine cannot be
manufactured without some types of paraphernalia such as the physical
equipment used to "cook" the drug. The analysis in the preceding
paragraph would seem to hold respecting paraphernalia fitting this
description. However, unlike chemical ingredients, paraphernalia such
as physical equipment is not used up in a single act of manufacture and
can be used over and over again. Other kinds of paraphernalia are
helpful but not necessary to manufacture. For both of these reasons,
possession of paraphernalia can involve harms not already inherent in
manufacture. Although the significance of these additional harms does
not rival that of manufacture itself, the paraphernalia offense is only a
drug severity level 4 felony, not a level 1 felony like manufacture or the
precursor offense when Schoonover was decided.
In contrast with manufacture and the precursor offense, multiple
convictions and punishment for manufacture and paraphernalia
possession accordingly can be reconciled with the principle of
proportioned punishment. State v. Patten affirmed the permissibility of
multiple convictions and punishment for these offenses through a
formalistic application of the Blockburger test. 128 The approach here
endorses the same conclusion through a more extended analysis that
consults the principle of proportioned punishment.
Although the paraphernalia offense can involve harm in addition to
that already implicit in manufacture, this will not necessarily be so in
every case. When it is not, multiple convictions and punishment will
conflict with the principle of proportioned punishment. One remedy,
which focuses on the sentences, would be to treat the imposition of
consecutive rather than concurrent sentences as an abuse of discretion. 129
128. 122 P.3d 350, 355 (Kan. 2005). The court reasoned: 'The crime of manufacture of
methamphetamine requires proof of the manufacture of methamphetamine, which is not required in
proving possession of drug paraphernalia. The crime of possession of drug paraphernalia requires
proof of possession of drug paraphernalia, which is not required in proving manufacture of
methamphetamine." [d.
129. This issue would arise very infrequently. The governing statutes and guidelines prohibit
consecutive sentences for manufacture and the paraphernalia offense except in very limited
circumstances. When the offender has been convicted of both manufacture and the paraphernalia
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Another remedy, which focuses on the convictions, would be to apply
the Blockburger test with reference to the facts of each particular case
rather than with reference to the offense elements in the abstract. The
inquiry would center not on whether the evidence used to establish the
paraphernalia offense was also used to establish manufacture, but rather,
given the paraphernalia items involved, on whether commission of that
offense involved harm in addition to that inherent in manufacture. The
Kansas Supreme Court and many other courts have favored the abstract
over fact-specific approach to Blockburger on grounds of certainty and
ease of application. 130 Particularly if imposition of consecutive sentences
is treated as abuse of discretion in appropriate cases, this is a sensible
approach. 131
offense, the guidelines presume a nonimprisonment sentence for the paraphernalia offense. See
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4720(b) (2007) (providing that the paraphernalia offense, as the nonbase
crime, be placed in the criminal history I column). A consecutive sentence of imprisonment for the
paraphernalia offense may be imposed only if substantial and compelling reasons justifY a
dispositional departure, § 21-4716(a), or if the offender was on probation or parole when the crimes
were committed. § 21-4603d(t).
When the issue does arise, the statutes' literal text appears to give sentencing judges unlimited
discretion to impose consecutive sentences. § 21-4603d(t) ("[T)he court may sentence the offender
to imprisonment for the new conviction, even when the new crime of conviction otherwise presumes
a nonprison sentence."); § 21-4720(b) ("The sentencing judge shall otherwise have discretion to
impose concurrent or consecutive sentences in multiple conviction cases."). The suggestion here is
that this discretion might be interpreted in light of and as limited by the principle of proportioned
punishment that pervades the code.
130. Patten, 122 P.3d at 393. For a discussion of adoption of this approach in other states, see
Hoffheimer, supra note 9, at 355, 366-67. In Kansas, a change in the wording of section 21-3107
also bears on the issue of whether courts should consider offense elements in the abstract or in the
context of specific facts of the case at hand. In 1998, the legislature amended one portion of that
provision's definition of a lesser included offense. The phrase "a crime necessarily proved if the
crime charged were proved" was revised to read "a crime where all elements of the lesser crime are
identical to some of the elements of the crime charged." Act of May 14, 1998, ch. 185, sec. I, § 21-
3107, 1998 Kan. Sess. Laws 1222. This amendment has been read to preclude use of the fact-
specific approach. See, e.g., State v. Gilbert, 32 P.3d 713, 717 (Kan. 2001); see also State v.
Schoonover, 133 P.3d 48, 73 (Kan. 2006) (noting conflicting precedents). For one discussion of
how courts applied the "necessarily proved" phrase in section 21-3107 prior to its amendment, see
Jason King, Comment, Simplifying the Issue?: State v. Fike and the Doctrine of Lesser Included
Offenses in Kansas, 45 U. KAN L. REV. 1463 (1997). See generally Hoffheimer, supra note 9, at
416-18.
131. The fact-specific approach would make only a marginal contribution to proportioned
punishment. Under the suggestion discussed supra in note 129, only concurrent sentences could be
imposed in cases where the paraphernalia offense involved no additional harm or culpability. The
conviction would remain but merely would affect the sentence for future offenses. In addition, the
fact-specific approach would be less efficient. Unlike the abstract approach, it would require
appellate review even when the defendant has received concurrent sentences.
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3. Attempted Manufacture and the Precursor and Paraphernalia
Offenses
There are several issues concerning the interrelationship between the
attempted manufacture and the paraphernalia and precursor offenses.
One is whether attempted manufacture and the precursor offense
constitute identical offenses in the sense McAdam and Campbell have in
mind. Another is whether a person may be punished both for attempted
manufacture and the precursor offense based upon the same conduct.
These same issues exist respecting attempted manufacture and the
paraphernalia offense.
The Kansas Supreme Court has addressed some of these issues. In
Stevens it held that, at least on the facts presented, a person may not be
convicted of and punished for both attempted manufacture and the
precursor offense. 132 Fanning holds that attempted manufacture and the
paraphernalia offense are not the same, so that a person convicted of
attempted manufacture is properly sentenced according to the stiffer
penalty for that offense. 133 How would the approach outlined in the
preceding section apply to these and the other issues?
Consider the issue of whether these offenses are "identical," such
that the more lenient penalty controls. Under the approach proposed
here, which rejects the McAdam/Campbell conception of identical
offenses, the answer is no. Legislative intent is the touchstone, and a
holding that attempted manufacture is identical to the precursor or
paraphernalia offense would subvert the penalty deliberately chosen for
attempted manufacture. In general, attempted commission of a drug
offense yields a sentence six months below the guideline for the
completed offense. 134 The legislature made a considered decision to
eliminate this six-month reduction for attempted drug manufacture and
punish attempted manufacture and manufacture at the same level. 135
Punishing attempted manufacture at the lower levels applicable to the
paraphernalia and precursor offense would undermine the legislature's
explicitly stated decision to treat attempted manufacture as a drug
132. See supra Part II.D.
133. [d.
134. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3301(d) (2007).
135. § 65-4159(d) (Supp. 2007) ("The provisions of subsection Cd) of K.S.A. 21-3301, and
amendments thereto, shall not apply to a violation of attempting to unlawfully manufacture any
controlled substance ....").
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severity level I felony.136 This decision is clearly constitutional and the
approach here requires that courts enforce it. 137
Now consider whether an offender may be convicted of and
punished for both attempted manufacture and the paraphernalia or
precursor offenses. The approach outlined here urges use of offense
relationship doctrines as a means of implementing the Legislature's
intent. One of these, the general versus specific offense doctrine, raises
the issue of whether the Legislature intended for persons to be charged
with and punished for only one offense and not the other. It did not. The
consequences of a holding that the precursor or paraphernalia offenses
are specific offenses in relation to the general offense of attempted
manufacture would be unacceptable. Such a holding would mean that an
offender must be charged with and punished for only the precursor or
paraphernalia offenses insofar as attempted manufacture is based upon
paraphernalia or precursor possession. This would subvert the
legislature's intent to punish attempted manufacture on the same level as
completed manufacture.
The principle of proportioned punishment, whose use the approach
here recommends as a guide to legislative intent, bolsters the conclusion
that the relationship between these offenses is not that of specific and
general offenses. There is no reason to conclude that persons who intend
to manufacture and whose overt acts have gone beyond preparation have
different levels of culpability depending on whether their overt acts are
based upon possession of paraphernalia, possession of chemical
ingredients, or other acts. Indeed, it seems irrational to conclude that
those whose overt acts consist of acquiring needed ingredients or
equipment have less culpability than those who have engaged in other
overt acts such as planning to acquire such ingredients or equipment.
Yet this would be the strange result of treating possession of precursors
and possession of paraphernalia as specific offenses to the general
offense of attempted manufacture. The precursor and paraphernalia
offenses are drug severity level 2 and 4 felonies, respectively, while
136. The precursor offense is currently graded a drug severity level 2 felony, § 65-7006(f), and
the paraphernalia offense as a drug severity level 4 felony. § 65-4l52(c).
137. Even if one accepts the identical doctrine, that doctrine can and should be applied
consistent with legislative intent. It is possible to interpret attempted manufacture as different from
the paraphernalia and precursor offenses, even insofar as attempted manufacture is based upon overt
acts of paraphernalia or precursor possession. Whereas attempted manufacture requires that a jury
conclude that the person has committed overt acts extending beyond mere preparation, the
paraphernalia and precursor offenses treat possession of paraphernalia or precursors as legally
sufficient without more. To preserve the level of punishment the legislature clearly intended for
attempted manufacture, the approach here requires that attempted manufacture be treated as different
from the precursor and paraphernalia offenses.
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attempted manufacture is a drug severity level 1 felony.138 The principle
of proportioned punishment furnishes a compelling reason to conclude
that the legislature would not endorse such a bizarre result.
The remaining issue is whether multiple convictions and punishment
are permissible. The inapplicability of the general versus specific
doctrine means that prosecutors are not required to use one offense over
another. But it does not necessarily imply that prosecutors may obtain
convictions and cumulative punishment for both. Under the approach
proposed here, a court's task is to fashion a result in harmony with
legislative intent.
Multiple convictions and punishment for both attempted
manufacture, on the one hand, and precursor or paraphernalia possession,
on the other, is not supported by the principle of proportioned
punishment and, hence, the legislature's presumed intent. Resort to that
principle is necessary because the legislature has not addressed this
precise issue. Whereas attempted manufacture requires overt action
going beyond preparation, the precursor and paraphernalia offenses
provide that possession of designated materials is by itself sufficient to
establish guilt for those offenses. The culpability and threatened harm
associated with attempted manufacture is somewhat greater because the
offender potentially is closer to completed manufacture. But this is only
marginally so. It will rarely be the case that a jury would conclude that
someone is guilty of the paraphernalia or precursor offense but not
attempted manufacture. Such a conclusion would require the jury to find
that a person who possessed necessary ingredients or paraphernalia such
as needed equipment with an intent to manufacture has not gone beyond
preparation.
The guideline sentence of ten years and more for attempted
manufacture is grossly disproportionate to the marginal additional
culpability which theoretically can be (but in practice infrequently will
be) associated with attempted manufacture. For this reason, the
legislature presumably does not intend for offenders to be convicted of
and punished for both attempted manufacture and the precursor or
paraphernalia offense.
The best view is that the relationship between attempted manufacture
and the precursor and paraphernalia offenses is that between greater and
lesser included offenses. Under this conception of the relationship, a
person may be charged with both attempted manufacture and the
precursor or paraphernalia offense but convicted and punished for only
138. §§ 65-4152(c), -7006(1), 65-41 59(b).
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one. When a jury finds that a person has possessed precursors with an
intent to manufacture and, based upon that same conduct, has gone
beyond preparation, he is guilty of attempted manufacture. Of course,
the elements of the precursor offense are also satisfied. But under the
principles governing lesser and greater offenses, the lesser precursor
offense merges with the greater so that the person may be convicted and
punished only for the greater offense of attempted manufacture.
As compared with permitting multiple convictions and punishment,
relating the offenses as greater and lesser offenses is more faithful to the
principle of proportioned punishment. Permitting multiple punishments
would allow a person to be punished for both a level 1 drug felony and a
level 2 or a level 4 felony. For an offender with one prior person felony,
the marginal step of moving from precursor or paraphernalia possession
to acts a jury finds goes beyond preparation would potentially add 170
months to the offender's sentence. 139 Under the greater and lesser
included offense conception, a person would be punished for a level 1
felony instead of a level 2 or level 4 felony or vice versa. Instead of
adding 170 months to the potential sentence, the step from the precursor
or paraphernalia possession to attempted manufacture would add 106 and
146 months, respectively.140 While still large, this difference is at least
more proportionate to the marginally increased harm and culpability
associated with attempted manufacture.
In addition, the result can be squared with the elements analysis
incorporated into section 21-3107. That provision defines a lesser
included offense as one in which "all elements of the lesser crime are
identical to some of the elements of the crime charged.,,141 Like
attempted manufacture, the paraphernalia and precursor offenses require
an intent to manufacture and overt action. Attempted manufacture
requires the additional element of overt action that goes beyond mere
preparation. 142
IV. CONCLUSION
The Kansas Supreme Court's decisions relating drug offenses are
problematic on a number of levels. Some are inconsistent with one
another. Some overlook the applicability of established concepts such as
lesser included versus greater offenses and general versus specific
139. KAN. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 21.
140. [d.
141. § 21-3107(2)(b)(2007).
142. See supra note 79.
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offenses. Many decisions contradict the basic criminal law precept that
punishment should be proportioned to harm and culpability. A couple,
McAdam and Campbell, run contrary to the Legislature's clear intent. In
defying both specific legislative desires and principles of harm and
culpability, the decisions pointlessly undermine the collaborative
relationship between the legislative and judicial branches that can and
should exist in this context.
These various problems are ultimately traceable to an
unacknowledged and undefended reliance on legal formalism, which
revolves around an entirely mechanical use of statutory text, offense
elements, and legal tests. Insensitive to legislative intent, criminal justice
policy, and social reality, this interpretive approach has led the court to
adopt wildly disproportionate remedies for inconsequential drafting
flaws and to reduce by more than ten years the harsh sentences the
legislature rationally wished to impose on those involved in
methamphetamine manufacture. This is legal formalism at its most
stubborn and least justifiable.
This Article has outlined a different approach, one that is less
mechanical and more inclusive. Offense elements are, of course,
relevant. But they are not incorporated into a reductionistic formula such
as the Blockbuster test or the same-elements test, which Schoonover
adopts to answer all offense relationship questions. The precise
relevance of offense elements instead should depend on the context and
ultimately serve the legislature's intent. The interpretation of legislative
intent, in tum, generally requires resort to the principle that criminal
punishment be proportioned to harm and culpability. Although this
Article's focus has been on drug offenses, the approach it proposes
applies to criminal offenses generally. In employing more realistic and
constructive methods of interpretation, the Article promises to help
rationalize the criminal code, foster a healthier relationship between the
legislature and the courts, and distance the Kansas Supreme Court from a
largely discredited jurisprudential approach.
***
